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Abstract
We study the effects of loans and mortgages securitization on business cycles by using a large-scale
15agent-based stock–flow consistent macroeconomic model and simulator. We enriched the model by
including a financial vehicle corporation, which buys loans and mortgages from banks and issues
asset-backed securities (ABSs) and mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), and a mutual fund, which
invests both in ABSs and MBSs using its liquidity resources and issues new shares when in liquidity
shortage. Households own the equity of the mutual fund in the form of equity shares. By means of se-
20curitization, banks conduct regulatory capital arbitrage and reduce risk-weighted assets in their bal-
ance sheet, thus being able to lend more loans and mortgages. Results show that different levels of
securitization propensity are able to affect credit and business cycles in different manners. On one
side, securitization increases banks’ lending activity, influencing positively investment and consump-
tion. On the other side, the increased amount of credit amplifies negative shocks, due to higher loans’
25write-offs probability, triggered by the boosted lending activity. Firms’ bankruptcies impact the equity
of banks, affecting their ability to grant new loans to consumption goods producers (CGPs), which
need credit for their production activity, and mortgages to households, which need them to purchase
housing units. The effect of securitization on the economy critically depends on the level of securitiza-
tion propensity on and the time span considered.
30JEL classification: E63, E32, G21, G23
1. Introduction
This work studies the impact of securitization on credit and business cycle using a macroeconomic agent-based and
stock–flow consistent model. Our aim is to show how securitization process deeply modifies the balance sheet struc-
35ture of banks with the effect of boosting lending activity, thus increasing consumption and investment, but also mak-
ing the banking system less resilient to endogenous crises, resulting in more credit rationing that trigger firms
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bankruptcy cascades, worsening economic performance. Increasing the securitization propensity, the second effect
prevails on the first one.
Securitization consists in the financial practice of pooling illiquid assets, such as mortgages and loans, and trans-
forming them into tradable securities, i.e., mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and asset-backed securities (ABSs),
5more liquid than the underlying loans or receivables, which are sold to interested investors. Securitization allows
credit institutions to remove risky assets from their balance sheets and consequently to overcome regulatory capital
requirements and increase their source of funding.
In a broader view, securitization can be considered as the core of the so-called shadow banking system, defined by
the Financial Stability Board as “the system of credit intermediation that involves entities and activities outside the
10regular banking system” (FSB, 2011). Shadow banking system includes a multitude of actors and several layers of
intermediation. Pozsar et al. (2010) describe in details shadow banks and their relationship with the traditional finan-
cial system. Shadow banking system has been listed as one of the main causes of the global financial crisis of 2007–
2009 (Lysandrou and Nesvetailova, 2014; Adrian and Shin, 2010), enhancing the efforts to find more efficient regu-
latory responses (see Gorton and Metrick, 2010; Nersisyan and Wray, 2010).
15Only few studies propose stock–flow consistent models of the shadow banking system or some of its components,
focusing on the securitization process and its role in influencing financial and real sectors. Fontana and Godin (2013)
study the effects of securitization on bank balance sheet and housing market, showing how securitization process can
lead to inflation balloons on security market driven by demand for deposits by speculative households and sales of
MBSs in the secondary market. In Bhaduri et al. (2015), authors show how securitization expands credit and deriva-
20tive trade leading to economic boom, but also increasing the fragility of the banking system, driven by the internal
fragility of the finance sector arising from its growing internal scarcity of liquidity. A stock–flow consistent model
that includes securitization process is developed also by Nikolaidi (2015), pointing out that the combination of risky
financial practices with wage stagnation can increase the likelihood of financial instability in a macro system.
Moreover Botta et al. (2016), following a post-Keynesian stock–flow consistent approach (Godley and Lavoie, 2012;
25Caverzasi and Godin, 2015), provide a model of shadow banking system analyzing its impact on the whole economy
from a macroeconomic perspective, showing how banks, before the crisis, were able to increase the issuance of mort-
gages while apparently keeping their financial position stable, leading to an increase in the financial instability and
that securitization process makes legislations on capital requirement not only ineffective but also potentially
counterproductive.
30We study the functioning and the effects of the securitization mechanism employing an agent-based and stock–
flow consistent macroeconomic model and simulator. A number of agent-based macro models have been proposed in
recent years to address sundry topics,1 see Fagiolo and Roventini (2017) for a comprehensive review and comparison
of the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) modeling and Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) approaches.
We analyze the effects of the securitization across the whole credit cycle and the consequent impact on the business
35cycle. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that includes securitization process in a large-scale agent-
based model, characterized by several classes of economic agents that interact through different markets, namely,
markets for consumption goods and capital goods, a housing market, a labor market, a credit market, and a financial
market for stocks and government bonds.
The main advantage of the agent-based approach is that it allows the study of the emergent aggregate statistical
40regularities in the economy, which are not originated by the behavior of an “average” individual, but are the result of
agents’ behavior and interactions. For instance, firms are heterogeneous, among other things, in terms of degree of fi-
nancial fragility. This type of heterogeneity plays a crucial role in the evolution over time of aggregate variables such
as production and unemployment. Moreover, small idiosyncratic shocks at the firm level may generate single firm
bankruptcies, which cause credit rationing by banks and so waves of bankruptcies among firms, inducing large aggre-
45gate fluctuations in the economy. This process plays a crucial role when we introduce securitization, since banks can
1 A list of macroeconomic ABM includes the K þ S model (Dosi et al. (2010, 2013, 2017), models developed by the Ancona
research group (Caiani et al. (2016); Riccetti et al. (2015); Russo et al. (2016)), the MacroAgent-Based Model with Capital
and Credit (CC-MABM) (Assenza et al., 2015), the Mark I CRISIS (Complexity Research Initiative for Systemic
Instabilities) model (Klimek et al., 2015; Gualdi et al., 2015), Iceace (Erlingsson et al., 2014), Eurace (Cincotti et al., 2012a),
and Eurace@UNIBI (Dawid et al., 2018).
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exploit regulatory capital arbitrage to lend more, increasing the amount of credit in the economy and thus making
bankruptcies more likely.
To study the securitization process, Eurace financial sector has been enriched with the implementation of a
financial vehicle corporation (FVC) and a mutual fund. The FVC buys loans and mortgages from banks and
5issues ABSs and MBSs to fund its purchases, while mutual fund purchases ABSs and MBSs and issues new shares
when in liquidity shortage. Banks decide the amount of credit to securitize endogenously. Being lending activity con-
strained by a minimum capital requirement, banks can avoid the capital constraints by selling loans or mortgages to
the FVC. This is an opportunity to free up their balance sheet from credit and their related risk and, consequently,
lend more.
10Results show that securitization mechanism is able to impact the business cycle. In the short run, banks sell their
assets, thus reducing the risk-weighted assets in their balance sheet and lending more loans and mortgages. Credit
increases, as well as the capital income of households that receive the profits of the mutual fund in the form of divi-
dends. Investment and consumption are influenced positively by the new credit triggered by securitization. However,
the increased amount of credit amplifies the negative shocks, due to higher loans write-offs probability, caused by the
15boosted lending activity in the short run. Firms’ bankruptcies impact the equity of banks, affecting their ability to
grant new loans to consumption goods producers (CGPs), which need credit for their production activity, and mort-
gages to households, which need credit to purchase housing units. CGPs soon go bankrupt and households see their
capital income reduced. The amplitude of securitization’s impact in the economy depends on the size of the
securitization availment itself. High securitization propensity improves the economic boom during expansions’
20phases of the business cycle but increases significantly the fragility of the economy, leading to deeper downturns.
Low amount of securitization, instead, can have positive effects both in the short and long run.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of empirical and theoretical literature related to
securitization. In Section 3, we introduce the baseline Eurace model with a particular emphasis on the single agents’
and sectorial balance sheets based on stock–flow consistency approach. In Section 4, securitization mechanism is
25described in details, and the new Eurace agents, namely, FVC (or special purpose vehicle) and mutual fund, are pre-
sented. In Section 5 we show the results of computational experiments. Section 6 concludes the article with final
remarks.
2. Securitization in empirical and theoretical literature
In the introduction, we have listed some stock–flow consistent models of securitization and stated the main advan-
30tages given by the agent-based approach to catch some relevant effects of securitization process. However, besides
stock–flow consistent modeling approaches, an increasing attention has been paid by several empirical and theoretic-
al studies to the securitization activity in the past decades. In this section we provide a survey of literature, focusing
on the benefits and costs of securitization, on the securitization impact at micro and macro level and on the role of
securitization in the last great financial crisis, explaining how our work fits in this debate.
35Securitization market exploded during the 1980s and kept growing in following decades. In Europe, securitization
market peaked before the last great crisis, with a total of e818 billion in new ABSs issuance in 2008. Demand for
these assets plummeted after 2008 because of the deterioration in the rating of the collateral behind the various types
of ABSs. At the end of 2016, the outstanding amount of European securitized assets was e1.5 trillion. For compari-
son, at its peak in 2008, the overall outstanding amount of the ABS market reached more than e2.2 trillion.2
40According to the literature, securitization has benefits and costs. On one side, banks can use securitization for con-
ducting regulatory capital arbitrage, by reducing their regulatory capital requirements and lend more (Jones, 2000;
Ambrose et al., 2005). Moreover, securitization represents a useful risk management tool for banks because it pro-
vides an additional source of funds and increases banks’ lending ability (see Loutskina, 2011). On the other side,
securitization enhances systemic risk, by reducing banks’ incentives to screen loans ex ante and monitoring after lend-
45ing (Keys et al., 2010). Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) study the full equilibrium dynamics of an economy with
financial frictions. They find that securitization and financial innovations include tools that, even if designed to better
manage risks at individual level, may increase systemic risk. Moreira and Savov (2017) present a macro-finance
model in which shadow banking and fragile liquidity transformation in the financial sector boost asset prices and
2 Data Source: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA).
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create growth in good times at the expense of bad times, and analyse the impact of policy interventions. Another
source of systemic risk can be, as stated in Wagner (2007), that banks use the liquidity gained by selling and hedging
loans using derivative instruments, to take more risk in primary markets, arising banking instability and the external-
ities associated with banking failures.
5Regarding the securitization impact at micro and macro level, so far the literature on securitization and structured
finance has been mainly focused on micro level. In particular, a lot of attention has been paid to risk-taking and
transfer (Instefjord, 2005; Chiesa, 2008; Acharya et al., 2013), tranching of derivative securities (Plantin, 2004;
DeMarzo, 2005), the role of collaterals for fiscal (Gorton and Ordonez, 2013) and monetary policies (Singh, 2013),
and the importance of computing margin requirements for risky collateral in the repo market including systemic risk
10(Lillo and Pirino, 2015).
In the aftermath of the last great crisis, the debate on the role of securitization has been particularly lively.
Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011) study the negative role of securitization in the deterioration of loans’ quality be-
fore the last financial crisis of 2008, providing also evidence that the rise and fall of the subprime mortgage market
follows a classic lending boom–bust scenario, in which unsustainable growth leads to the collapse of the market. The
15study of Gorton and Metrick (2012) shows, using empirical data, that securitization led higher uncertainty about
bank solvency, increasing the repo haircuts and making the US banking system insolvent during the last great finan-
cial crisis. Di Patti and Sette (2016) analyze Italian data and show that the degree to which banks tightened credit
supply to nonfinancial firms during crisis is positively related to the share of loans they securitized before the crisis,
resulting in lower credit growth, higher interest rates, lower probability of accepting loan applications, and inability
20of firms to fully compensate the negative credit supply shocks. Despite its negative facade, mainly due to the specula-
tive purpose followed by several financial actors before the financial crisis, sustainable securitization has been indi-
cated as a resource of funding for firms or households (see Segoviano et al., 2013). Moreover, Bertay et al. (2016)
emphasize the positive correlation of firms’ loans securitization with the economic activity. Among its role as source
of funding, a transparent securitization could also help investors, allowing them to diversify their portfolios in terms
25of risk and return, leading to lower costs of capital, benefits for the economic activity, and a broader distribution of
risk (BoE and ECB, 2014). Fujii (2012) suggests regulatory solutions at individual level and extensive reporting
requirements of financial institutions to mitigate systemic risk.
In this article, we do not want to focus on the individual banks decisions, but we analyze how securitization
affects business cycle, trying to explain how securitization can impact economic activity, either in a positive or nega-
30tive way. The channels linking securitization and real economy are mainly two (see Bertay et al., 2016 and the related
literature). The first one is the change in credit volume of the economy that can result in more consumption for
households and more funds for investments for firms. However, excess use of securitization can lead to bankruptcies
and worsen economic performance. The second one regards the credit quality, i.e., securitization would help banks
to reduce its constrains and allocate capital in the economy in a more efficient way, favoring the flows of capital to
35most productive firms while sharing the risk among investors. Also in this case, scholars do not completely agree. For
instance, Pennacchi (1988) suggests that banks after securitizing are not interested in ensuring the good quality of the
borrowers. In our model we focus on the credit volume channel, and we do not pay attention on the differences
among borrowers’ quality in bank lending decision.
3. Eurace baseline model
40The Eurace agent-based model and simulator represent a fully integrated macroeconomy composed by several agents
that act following behavioral rules and interact through various markets. The model was created during 2006–2009
under the FP6 European Funded Project “EURACE” and since then has been developed to date and strongly
improved in the past 3 years under the FP7 European Funded Project “SYMPHONY”(see Ozel et al., 2016; Teglio
et al., 2017; Raberto et al., 2018; Ponta et al., 2018). In the model, agents’ decision processes are characterized by
45bounded rationality and limited capabilities of computation and information gathering; thus, agents’ behavior fol-
lows adaptive rules derived from the management literature about firms and banks, and from experimental econom-
ics literature about the behavior of consumers and financial investors.
Moreover, agents interact in different types of markets, i.e., markets for consumption goods and capital good,
labor market, credit market, and financial market for stocks and government bonds. In the Eurace ABM model, mar-
50kets represent the place where agents interact. Markets are based on a decentralized exchange with pairwise trading
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and price dispersion, except for financial market where a centralized Walrasian auctioneer operates and a single price
is set at the intersection of the demand and supply curves. In decentralized markets, prices are set by agents on the
supply side, by considering a markup on unit costs. For a detailed description of agents’ behaviors about decision-
making hypotheses in real (consumption goods and labor) markets as well as in credit market, see Teglio et al.
5(2010); Cincotti et al. (2012b); Raberto et al. (2012); Teglio et al. (2017).
The baseline Eurace model includes:
• Households (HHs): They act as consumers and workers. Households buy homogeneous consumption goods from
CPGs according to their consumption budget and provide labor force to CPGs. Households can invest in the stock
and in the government bond markets. The saving-consumption decision is modeled according to the theory of buf-
fer stock saving behavior, which states that households consumption depends on a precautionary saving motive,
10determined by a target level of wealth to income ratio (Deaton, 1992; Carroll, 2001). Households can invest their
savings in the asset market, by buying and selling equity shares or government bonds. Households’ portfolio allo-
cation is modeled according to a preference structure designed to take into account the psychological findings
emerged in the framework of behavioral finance and in particular of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Households’ behavior in the financial market has been thoroughly
15described in Raberto et al. (2008) and Teglio et al. (2009). In addition, households finance the securitization pro-
cess by purchasing the shares issued by the mutual fund, when the latter faces a liquidity shortage.
• CGPs: They employ labor and capital goods to produce a homogeneous consumption good according to their
production plan. CGPs act as price setters in the sale markets and supply their output following a short-term
profit maximizing behavior. In fact, CGPs are characterized by a short-term profit objective and make production
and investment plans where expected future revenues are based on backward-looking expectations determined by
20past sales and prices. In particular, production plans depend on past sales and the inventory stock, along the lines
of the inventory management literature (Hillier and Lieberman, 1986), while sale prices are determined by a
markup on costs (wages and debt interests, see Plott and Sunder, 1982; Fabiani et al., 2006). Investment plans de-
pend on the cost of capital good and the present value3 of the additional foreseen revenues but are limited by both
internal4 and external financing capabilities.5 CGPs can also borrow money from banks to pay production factors
25and make investments. They are modeled as corporations whose shares are public and traded in the stock market.
CGPs can also issue new shares to finance their activities if rationed in the credit market.
Furthermore, two different types of bankruptcies for CGPs are considered in the model, namely, insolvency
bankruptcy and illiquidity bankruptcy. The first type (insolvency) occurs when firm’s equity goes negative. The se-
cond type (illiquidity) is when a firm, even if still characterized by positive net worth, is short of sufficient liquidity
30to pay its unavoidable financial commitments (taxes and debt service), because it is rationed in the credit market
and is unable to sell new shares in the stock market. In both bankruptcy cases, all firm’s employees are fired, the
firm’s physical capital is frozen, and the firm remains inactive for a fixed period of months until new financial cap-
ital is raised in the stock market. In the most severe case (insolvency), firm’s shareholders are also wiped out, and
firm’s debt is restructured and set to a new target level which is a fraction of firm’s total assets so to get again posi-
35tive net worth. The amount of the debt exceeding the new target is then written-off, and accordingly the corre-
sponding loans in the asset side of the lending banks are also written-off. Banks lending to the insolvent firm then
are subject to a corresponding reduction of their equity base, which may hinder their capacity to supply new
credit due to the Basel capital adequacy constraints. Then an insolvency of a big borrower may trigger a wide-
spread credit rationing and a wave of illiquidity bankruptcies with relevant negative impact on both the employ-
40ment and output levels.
• Capital goods producer (KGP): There is just one type of technology for capital goods. Capital goods are produced
on request and therefore do not generate inventories.
• Banks (Bs): Banks supply loans to CGPs to finance their operations and mortgages to households that want pur-
chase housing units, collect private sector deposits (i.e. the liquidity of all private agents), and may borrow from
3 According to empirical surveys (Graham and Harvey, 2001, 2002), the net present value is one of the most popular
method used by managers to evaluate investments.
4 Along the lines of Fazzari et al. (2008).
5 The pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) is adopted to determine a hierarchy of financial sources for the firm.
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the central bank if in shortage of liquidity through a standing facility. Lending activity by banks is constrained
by a minimum capital requirement and depends also on the evaluation of the balance sheet of the borrower.
In the market for loans, CGPs apply for credit first to their preferred bank, then if rationed to another selected
bank. If CGPs are rationed by both their preferred bank and by a second bank, they will be forced to cut their
5dividend payment. It is worth noting that, in line with the working of the banking system in a modern capitalist
economy (see McLeay et al., 2014), bank lending is not limited by the available liquidity and, whenever a bank
grants a loan, a corresponding deposit, entitled to the borrower, is created on the liability side of the bank’s bal-
ance sheet.
• Government (G): Government is responsible for the fiscal and welfare policies. The income of the government is
given by corporate tax, value-added tax, capital income tax (dividends and bond coupons), and labor tax.
10The tax payments are done by CGPs, KGP, banks and households, and the government budget income is calcu-
lated as the sum of all tax payments. Taxes are collected on monthly basis, while tax rates are revised yearly.
Regarding government’s expenditures, they include wages for households employed in the public sector that are
set as fixed percentage of the total households, unemployment benefits, transfers, and repayment of the govern-
ment debt (bond coupons). The government observes its budget balance (payment account MG) every month
15and if MG < 0, the government has a budget deficit which can be financed by issuing new government bonds
that are sold to the households. The government computes its budget deficit once per month but enters in the
bond market on a daily basis. The reason is that if the government enters in the bond market only once per
month, there is insufficient demand for the bonds, so the Government may fail to attain its liquidity target. Thus
the monthly budget deficit will be financed by bonds on a monthly basis, but there is a smoothing across the
20month.
• Central Bank (CB): The central bank is the responsible for the monetary policy. It sets the policy rate, which is
the cost of liquidity provided to banks. The short-term nominal interest rate follows the Taylor rule (see Taylor
(1993) for a discussion) and is set as:
rcb ¼ pþ apðp ~pÞ  atðt tÞ (1)
where p is the yearly inflation rate for a current month, ~p is the desired rate of inflation, t is the unemployment
rate for a current month, and t mimics the natural rate of unemployment, or the full-employment rate (that we ex-
ogenously set to 0 for simplicity). This version of the Taylor rule departs from the standard one for its use of the
25unemployment rate instead of the output. The two measures are strongly interconnected, and the unemployment
gap is certainly a satisfactory indicator of economic recession. Another role of the central bank is the provision of
a standing facility to grant liquidity in infinite supply to commercial banks, when they are in short supply.
3.1 Eurace stocks and flows matrices
Each agent is characterized by a double-entry balance sheet with a detailed account of all monetary and real assets as
30well as monetary liabilities. Monetary and real flows given by agents’ behaviors and interactions determine the
period by period balance sheet dynamics. A stock–flow model is then created and used to check that all monetary
and real flows are accounted for, and that all changes to stock variables are consistent with these flows (see Cincotti
et al., 2012b; Raberto et al., 2012 for further details). According to the “stock-flow consistency” approach used in
Godley and Lavoie (2012) and post-Keynesian stock–flow consistent modeling (see Caverzasi and Godin, 2015 for a
35survey), we present four significant matrices that provide an exhaustive description of the model. Table 1 is the agent
class balance sheet, i.e., the asset and liability entries of each particular agent type. Table 2 represents the balance
sheet matrix, describing all assets and liabilities for each sector (here a sector has to be seen as a class of agents).
Table 3, called transaction flow matrix, shows all the stock and monetary flows among agents. Table 4, called equity
capital change matrix, reports the variation of agents’ net worth between two periods, due to net cash flows, price
40changes in assets and liabilities, stock changes in real assets, and issues of equity shares.
In the matrix in Table 2 a plus (minus) sign corresponds to agents’ assets (liabilities), and each column can be
read as the aggregated balance sheet of a specific sector (e.g., households). Rows show assets and claims of assets
among sectors, thus generally adding up to 0. Exceptions are capital and inventories, which are accumulated by
CGPs, and households’ equity shares of CGPs and banks that do not add up to 0 because of the difference between
6 A. Mazzocchetti et al.
market price and book value. However, being the equity shares of KGP, FVC (V), and mutual fund (D) not traded in
the financial market, their market price and book value coincide.
In Table 3, the top part (Cash receipts/outlays) describes the flows of revenues (plus sign) and payments (minus
sign) that agents get and make. Agents are reported in the columns, and monetary flows are reported in the rows.
5The result of agents’ sector transactions is the net cash flow (NCF). The bottom part of Table 3 (Change in financial/
monetary assets/liabilities) describes the balance sheet changes related to each sector.
3.2 Money creation
The central bank can introduce new liquidity (or fiat money) into the system via loans provided to banks when they
are in liquidity shortage.
10In this case, the economic agents deposit an amount equal to the new fiat money in the banking sector, generating
additional liquidity that is deposited at the central bank and, in turn, generates new liquidity of the central bank that
is always equal to the amount of fiat money created. This is the reason why in Table 2, the difference between fiat
money and central bank liquidity is constant and equal to the initial central bank liquidity. Furthermore, money sup-
ply in the economy can variate independently from the fiat money created by the central bank, because it
Table 1. Agent class balance sheets
Agent class Assets Liabilities
Household Liquidity: Mh Mortgages: Uh
abbrev.: HH Stock portfolio: Equity: Eh




Government bonds: nh;G pG
Housing units: Xh
Consumption goods producer Liquidity: Mf Debt: Df ¼
P
b ‘f ;b
abbrev.: CGP Capital goods: Kf Equity: Ef
index: f ¼ 1; . . . ;NFirm Inventories: If
Capital goods producer Liquidity: MK Equity: EK
abbrev.: KGP
Financial vehicle corporation Liquidity: MV ABSs: ABSV
abbrev.: V Loans: LV MBSs: MBSV
Mortgages: UV Equity: EV
Mutual fund Liquidity: MD Equity: ED
abbrev.: D ABSs: ABSD
MBSs: MBSD
Bank Liquidity: Mb Deposits:





index: b ¼ 1; . . . ;NBank Loans: Lb ¼
P
f ‘b;f CB standing facility: Db ¼ ‘b;CB
Mortgages: Ub ¼
P
h Ub;h Equity: Eb
Stock portfolio: nEb;V pEV
Government Liquidity: MG Outstanding government bonds value: DG ¼ nG pG
abbrev.: G Equity: EG
Central Bank Liquidity: MCB Outstanding fiat money: FiatCB
abbrev.: CB Loans to banks: ‘CB ¼
P
b ‘CB;b Deposits: DCB ¼
P
b Mb þMG
Gov Bonds: nCB;G pG Equity: ECB
Note: Balance sheets of any agent class characterizing the Eurace economy. Balance sheet entries in the table have a subscript character, which is the index of an
agent in the class to which the variable refers. In some cases, we can find two subscript characters, where the second one refers to the index of an agent in another class
where there is the balance sheet counterpart. For instance, Df refers to the total debt of firm f, i.e., a liability, and Lb refers to the aggregate loans of bank b, i.e., an




f ‘b;f represents an aggregate balance sheet identity, which is verified along
the entire simulation. nEh;x represents the number of outstanding equity shares of agents x held by households h. The market price of the equity shares is given by pEx .
The stock portfolio’s value of household h is then computed as:
P
x nEh;x pEx . Government bonds’ number and market price are given by nG and pG, respectively.
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endogenously raises every time a bank grants a new loan, and it decreases when the loan is paid back. Securitization
process is able to increase the money supply through the market channel, exploiting the possibility of the banks to
sell loans and mortgages to FVC that in turn issue ABSs and MBSs, sold to the mutual fund. Through the capital arbi-
trage, banks are able to avoid capital requirements and affect the endogenous money creation.
54. Securitization and money market creation
To study the securitization mechanism, Eurace baseline model has been enriched with the addition of two agents:
• FVC (V): It carries out securitization transactions. The role of FVC is the transformation of banks’ loans and
mortgages in ABSs and MBSs. In particular, banks sell to the FVC loans and mortgages that they want to put off
their balance sheet. To fund banks’ credit purchase, FVC creates pools of loans and mortgages and issues ABSs
and/or MBSs.
• Mutual fund (D): It represents the demand side of ABSs and MBSs. It purchases ABSs and MBSs using internal
10resources and, in case of liquidity shortage, issues new shares that are bought by households. Together with the
purchase of ABSs and MBSs, it receives the right to collect the cash flows related to the securitized credit, i.e.,
principals and interests. Its equity is owned in the form of equity shares by households that receive the profit of
the fund through dividends.
Securitization mechanism empowers banks with the possibility to sell loans and mortgages to the FVC, which
15transfers them out of its balance sheet in the form of ABSs and MBSs, sold to the mutual fund. Thus, banks are able
to free their balance sheet from loans and mortgages and their related risk. The relevance of securitization process in
Eurace is due to the presence in the model of a realistic banks’ capital requirement provision that mimics Basel II/III
regulations. In particular, the amount of banks’ risk-weighted assets cannot exceed a maximum level with respect to
the equity capital, to have a sufficient buffer to cushion possible loans and mortgages write-offs. Thus securitization
20process can be used by banks for regulatory capital arbitrage. A detailed description of the Eurace credit market and
securitization process follows.
4.1 Credit supply
Let us consider a bank b with equity Eb and risk-weighted portfolio Wb, consisting of risk-weighted loans Wb;L and
mortgages Wb;U, such that:
Wb ¼Wb;L þWb;U: (2)
25Suppose that a CGP sends a loan request amount kf to the bank b. Let us assume that xkf is the risk weight of
loan kf (i.e., accounts for the financial fragility of the prospective borrower); then we set xkf to depend on the bor-
rower’s default probability as follows:
xkf ¼ 2:5ðpf Þ
3; (3)
where pf represents the default probability of the borrower based on its leverage, along the lines of the Moody’s
KMV (Kealhofer, McQuown and Vasicek) model (Saunders and Allen, 2010):
pf ¼
Df þ kf
Df þ kf þ Ef
; (4)
where Df and Ef are the amount of debt and equity of the CGP f. Equation 3 represents a cubic function approximat-
30ing the so-called Basel II internal ratings approach (see Yeh et al., 2005). In this way, different credit ratings are
assigned to different borrowers, and the risks associated to their loans have different weights in banks balance sheet.
Bank b is allowed to lend up to the amount ‘bf  kf provided that its equity (capital base) is at least a fraction k of
Wb þ xkf ‘bf :
Wb þ xkf ‘bf  aEb; (5)
where a is the inverse of k, i.e., a ¼ 1=k.
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Besides CGP, households can send credit requests to banks. Whenever they enter in the housing market, they can
buy house units and, in case their liquidity is lower than the offered price, they ask for a mortgage (see Ozel et al.,
2016). Let us assume that Ûbh is the mortgage asked by the potential borrower (household h) to the bank b. Bank b
can grant the mortgage amount Ûbh to household h only if its capital requirement is satisfied, following the same con-
5dition expressed in equation (5) for loans to CGPs:
Wb þ xÛh Ûbh  aEb: (6)
Differently from CGP loans, risk weight of household mortgages xÛh is assumed constant and equal to 0.5.
However, a flow control measure, namely, debt-service-to-income (DSTI), checks incomes and debt payments of
the household for the upcoming quarter. In particular, banks can provide mortgages only if the total mortgage pay-
10ments of the applicant are lower than a DSTI ratio of his income, i.e.,
RUh þ RÛh  DSTIðZl þ ZeÞ (7)
where RUh þ RÛh is the quarterly payments (principal and interests) related to both present mortgages Uh of house-
hold h and the new mortgage Ûh. Zl þ Ze is the sum of quarterly labor and capital income after taxes.
4.2 Securitization mechanism
As stated in the equations (5) and (6), bank’s lending activity is limited by the ratio of its risk-weighted assets and
equity, according to the regulatory capital requirements. The ceiling of risk-weighted assets for the bank is given by a
15times its equity capital, i.e., aEb. Thus, from a regulatory perspective, bank is constrained by the following rule:
Wb  aEb. With the introduction of the securitization mechanism, the bank can put off its balance sheet the amount
of risk-weighted assets that exceeds the ceiling. Moreover, we want to add a behavioral rule, by considering different
thresholds, computed quarterly as a fraction of the ceiling. Therefore, we introduce an exogenous securitization pro-
pensity parameter l. According to l, the bank’s threshold is given by ð1 lÞaEb. The higher the value of l, the lower
20will be the threshold of the bank, resulting in more securitization. In fact, whenever bank’s risk-weighted assets ex-
ceed the threshold, the bank computes the amount Sb of risk-weighted assets that it want to sell to the FVC as:
Sb ¼Wb  ð1 lÞaEb if Wb>ð1 lÞaEb
Sb ¼ 0 if Wbð1 lÞaEb

(8)
We define Lb and Ub as the amount of loans and mortgages in bank b balance sheet. The fraction of loans (LSb )
and/or mortgages (USb ) that the bank will securitize and sell to the FVC is computed as the ratio between Sb and the
25bank’s risk-weighted assets and is uniformly distributed among bank’s loans and/or mortgages. In particular, we con-
sider three settings, depending on the type of credit securitized:






LSb¼Lb if Wb;L Sb
8><
>: (9)
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FVC funds the purchase of loans and mortgages by issuing ABSs and/or MBSs. The securitized assets are then sold
to the mutual fund. This process allows the bank to free its balance sheet from an amount of risk-weighted assets
equal to Sb, decreasing the amount of Wb and allowing the bank to lend more, according to equations (5) and (6).
5Thus new money can be created in the system by a process that involves agents outside the banking sector.
4.3 Stock-flow consistency of securitization process
To ensure the stock–flow consistency of the securitization mechanism, and to model a reliable securitization process
in a macroeconomic large-scale simulator, we have implemented the FVC and the mutual fund in a more stylized
way compared with the credit and banking sector, but still consistent with the research question, that focuses on
10banks’ ability to exploit securitization (at different intensity levels) for capital arbitrage purposes, and on the effects
of this process on the credit and business cycles.
In particular, the mutual fund is endowed with an initial provision of liquidity that is able to absorb an amount of
securitized products for a given, limited, period. In our simulations, this period corresponds to two quarters, com-
puted with l equal to 100%. In addition, the mutual fund can issue new shares to increase its liquid resources and
15therefore to finance ABSs and MBSs purchases. The fund aims at maintaining its liquidity at the target level,6 issuing
new shares when the liquidity goes down below the target.
Let us assume that MD is the liquidity target of the mutual fund, while MD represents its current level of liquid
resources. In each quarter, mutual fund computes its liquidity needs LD as:
LD¼MD MD if MD>MD
LD¼ 0 if MDMD

(13)
20Therefore, LD represents the amount of liquidity that the fund should rise by issuing new shares. The rationale be-
hind this choice is to avoid linking directly each quarterly securitization process to the issuing of new shares, there-
fore giving rise to frequent shocks on household net income, but to let the fund to periodically adjust its liquidity
level to have always enough resources to purchase ABSs and MBSs. In fact, the liquidity of the fund decreases when-
ever new securitized products are purchased, while it increases each time households and/or CGPs repay loan and/or
25mortgage installments. The fund computes quarterly the needed liquidity to reach its target, and, accordingly, issues
new shares that are bought by the households at the face value7 and distributed among them proportionally to their
net income. The shares owned by households give them the right to receive the earnings of the mutual fund, which
are given by the interest payments on the credit associated with securitized products. This payment of dividends
ensures that the fund does not accumulate any profit.
30Two relevant points deserve attention: first, we do not model a market for ABSs and MBSs with related prices
and a behaviorial specification of the demand side; second, the demand side is made by households whose role as
fund’s shares investors does not involve a portfolio choice model but is limited to a sort of compulsory purchase.
However, it is worth remarking that the purchase of ABSs and MBSs by the mutual fund is definitely not a free lunch
and is not 100% guaranteed, and it has also effects on the economy. In particular, households are available to buy
35mutual fund’s shares only within a certain proportion of their net income; otherwise, mutual fund may not be able to
fully finance the purchase of ABSs and MBSs, and securitization stops until new funds are raised by the mutual fund
itself. Furthermore, the purchase of fund’s shares reduces households’ consumption budget, and then affecting aggre-
gate consumption in the economy, although this effect in the medium term is counterbalanced by dividend income
deriving from the profits of the mutual fund. Generally speaking, we want to emphasize that our aim is to analyze
40how different levels of securitization, entailed by securitization propensity l, impact the credit market and the busi-
ness cycle, regardless of a particular behavioral model of demand for derivative products. The novelty compared to
the endogenous credit–money approach, already studied with Eurace (see Raberto et al., 2012), is the fact that the
6 We define the target level as the fixed amount of “operating liquidity” that is needed to carry out the securitization pro-
cess for a quarter, which corresponds to half of the initial provision of liquidity. It is worth noting that the fund uses this
liquidity simply as a buffer for its securitization activity but relies on share issuing for financing new purchases. As the
securitization process is operating quarterly, our parsimonious choice guarantees the operations of the fund but limits
an unrealistic accumulation of liquidity.
7 The face value is computed as the ratio between the nominal value of the mutual fund assets divided by the number of
outstanding shares.
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parties involved are not only banks and borrowers, but also a system that operates outside the banking sector and
allows banks to overcome regulatory requirements, with considerable impact on the real economy.
Concerning the stock–flow consistency of the securitization process, it is worth to point out that securitization
mechanism does not only include the credit transfer but also the payment of the related flows. When a bank sells






. They represent the fractions of loans or mortgages securitized (quarterly) over the total loans or mortgages
held by the bank b. But they also represent the fraction of interests, principals, and installments that borrowers pay
to banks and that shall be paid to the owner of securitized credit, i.e., mutual fund, through the intermediation of
FVC. In Eurace, every loan and mortgage has a fixed period of repayments, i.e., 24 months for loans and 240 months
10for mortgages. Firms pay monthly the debt interests and debt installments until the period of repayment is termined.
Also households make monthly mortgage payments that include both interests and the principal installment, where
the latter is fixed and determined by the ratio between the initial mortgage amount and mortgage duration in
months.8 Given that every bank can grant loans and mortgages on daily basis, whenever securitization is active and a
bank sells a fraction of loans and mortgages to the FVC (/l and /m), that stock of credit includes a portion of several
15loans and/or mortgages, characterized by different amounts, residual months left to be repaid, and interests. We keep
track of each of those variables for each borrower when securitizing credit. This process has a primary importance,
since the fraction of credit securitized must be equal to the fraction of installments, principals, and interests of loans
and/or mortgages involved in securitization and repaid monthly. This process ensures that the stock–flow consistency
is always satisfied (see Tables 2–4).
20In the same period when FVC receives securitized credits, it pools all those credits together creating ABSs (using
loans) and MBSs (using mortgages). Each pool of credit corresponds to the sum of quarterly securitized credit. ABSs
and MBSs are not modeled as new bonds created by FVC, homogenized in terms of expiration and interest rate.
They represent the sum of the pooled credit of each securitization activity. But, of course, each pool of credit is
backed by the correspondent cash flow of loans’ and/or mortgages’ principals and interests. After pooling credit,
25FVC sells ABSs and MBSs to the mutual fund and then pays the bank. ABSs and MBSs, at the current stage, are not
traded in the financial market. Therefore, they are sold at their face value to the mutual fund that keeps them in its
balance sheet after purchasing them.
Finally, securitized loans’ and mortgages’ write-offs burden both on banks and mutual fund. In fact, since each
securitization activity involves a stock composed by several loans and mortgages, whenever a credit is not repaid by
30the borrower, it is written-off by both banks and mutual fund, according to /l and /m.
5. Computational experiments
Results are based on Monte Carlo computational experiments, i.e., simulations were run using different seeds of the
pseudo-random number generator for each scenario. We consider three different settings for securitization, as
explained in Section 4.2:
• LS: Only loans are securitized.
• MS: Only mortgages are securitized.
• TS: Both loans and mortgages are securitized.
35Moreover, we consider four values of l (0%, 15%, 30%, and 45%); thus there are a total of 12 scenarios.
Simulations run for a time span of 15 years and 50 seeds per scenario have been used, for a total of 600 simulations.
Furthermore, simulations have been performed with the following settings: 3000 households, 50 CGPs, 3 banks,
1 capital good producer, 1 government, and 1 Central Bank. We present results using time trajectories, boxplots, and
averages. Trajectories are presented only for one seed and TS scenario; they provide a clear comparison of the differ-
40ent TS scenarios across time. Furthermore, for statistical robustness, a set of boxplots is presented. They show, for
three settings of securitization (LS, MS, and TS) and four values of l (0, 15%, 30%, and 45%), the distribution of
economic and financial variables over the 50 seeds used to initialize the pseudo-random number generator. Boxplots
8 However, in the housing market, households can sell their house units and extinguish a mortgage before the fixed period
of repayment.
14 A. Mazzocchetti et al.
report time averages, and we have considered three time spans, each of them starting from Year 3 and lasting until
the end of Year 5, Year 10, and Year 15. Therefore, time spans include 2, 8, and 13 years, respectively. In the box-
plots, the top of the rectangle indicates the third quartile, the horizontal line inside the rectangle indicates the median,
and the bottom of the rectangle indicates the first quartile. The vertical line that extends to the top of the rectangle
5indicates the maximum value, and another vertical line that extends to the bottom of the rectangle indicates the min-
imum value. The points inside the boxplots represent the yearly averages. Simulations run for a time span of 15 years,
but for the first 3 years banks are not allowed to sell credit to FVC; thus there are 3 years of common transition
phase, which we do not consider in the analysis. Simulation can diverge at the beginning of Year 4, when banks can
sell credit to FVC, and thus, the distinction among securitization scenarios is enabled. In this way, there is a second
1012-year period, which is different for each scenario but originates from the same initial conditions. In the description
of results, we refer to credit as the sum of loans and mortgages. In-BS credit represents the credit accounted in banks’
balance sheet, while off-BS credit is the credit securitized and put off banks’ balance sheet. Total credit represents the
sum of in-BS credit and off-BS credit. Finally, since in the explanations of computational experiments’ results we
often refer to the synchronization among different variables during the business cycle, we have performed a cross-
15correlation analysis, to objectively assess the correlation of those variables for different time lags.
Figure 1 and Table 5 show the correlation structure of the real gross domestic product (GDP). We consider
monthly time series’ averages of 50 simulation runs detrended by using the Hodrick–Prescott (HP) filter, one for each
seed used for the pseudo-random number generator. In Figure 1, we show the cross-correlations for 20 positive and
negative lags, as well as the upper and lower confidence bounds. Table 5 summarizes the results of Figure 1 and
20includes also the standard error of Monte Carlo simulations. We observe that real GDP is positively correlated with
consumption and investments, and it is anti-correlated with the unemployment rate. GDP also shows a positive cor-
relation with loans to firms, which are leading the business cycle expansion, while it shows an anti-correlation with
firms’ bankruptcies, which are coincidental with a cycle contraction. This results are in line with main stylized facts
on credit and business cycle (see for instance Watson and Stock, 1999; Napoletano et al., 2006; Cappiello et al.,
252010; Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe, 2017).
Figure 1. Cross-correlations. Time series considered are monthly and HP filtered.
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5.1 Regulatory capital arbitrage
Before delving into the results regarding banks’ regulatory capital arbitrage, we shall explain in detail the effects of
securitization on banks’ equity and assets, to provide a clearer picture of their role in credit lending mechanism.
Boxplots in Figure 2 show the evolution of banks’ equity for three time spans (Years 5, 10, and 15) and four
5securitization propensities (0%, 15%, 30%, and 45%). A vertical inspection of the boxplots shows that banks’
equity strongly increases in the scenario featured by the lowest securitization propensity (l¼ 0%), almost doubling
in Year 15. In this scenario, the growth of banks’ equity is clearly related to the increase in banks’ total assets, which
is in turn related to the general growth of the economic activity. When total assets of banks increase, banks have to
raise their equity to comply with the capital requirements. The fact that banks’ assets increase is certified in boxplots
10in Figures 3–5, while the fact that banks maintain an equity to in-BS credit ratio slightly superior to 10% is shown in
boxplots in Figure 6. The mechanism that allows banks to increase their equity to respect capital requirements is
based on retained earnings; therefore, when a bank falls short in capital, it retains earnings to increase it. When we
consider the practice of securitization, a part of banks’ assets is transferred to the FVC, and therefore, banks diminish
the amount of in-BS assets while increasing the amount of off-BS assets, as clearly displayed in Figure 7 and remarked
15in boxplots in Figures 8 and 9. Moreover, Figure 10 includes the quarterly amount of loans and mortgages
securitized. These flow representations allow to better assess the link between securitized credit and macroeconomic
variables, such as consumption and investment, across the different phases of the business cycle.
Lower in-BS assets lead to lower equity capital needs for banks; thus the equity growth is lower than in case of
l¼ 0%. We see from Figure 11 and boxplots in Figure 2 that the higher the securitization propensity, the lower the
20need to increase equity with respect to the initial value, because of an increasing portion of total assets that flows out
of the balance sheets and out of regulatory control. In the extreme case of l¼45%, banks do not need to raise equity
at all because the off-BS assets fraction is sufficiently high to compensate the increase of loans and mortgages by
banks, which would push up equity requirements. We report the level of in-BS credit (boxplots in Figure 12) to better
catch the similarity of pattern with respect to banks’ equity (boxplots in Figure 2). Therefore, an increase of
25securitization propensity implies that banks do not need to increase equity as much as in the scenario of l ¼ 0%.
The consequence is an increase of banks’ fragility and systemic risk, since credit institutions have lower equity to
bear firms’ bankruptcies during recessions, as better outlined in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.
Regarding the purchase of ABSs and MBSs, as stated in Section 4.3, the mutual fund uses its liquid resources (box-
plots in Figure 13) and, if necessary, issues new shares (boxplots in Figure 14). Both figures show that for higher
30securitization propensity and time span, the funding needs of the mutual fund increase, and therefore, more shares
are issued, especially in TS scenario, that is the one where more credit is securitized, as explained afterward.
Furthermore, the new shares issued by the fund are bought by households that invest a part of their net income in
those equity shares, as shown in boxplots in Figure 15, that display the size of households’ purchases in relative
terms, reaching the 10% in the extreme case of l equal to 45% and time span of 15 year in TS scenario. Although
Table 5. Cross-correlation of HP filtered series vs. real GDP
Filtered series t  4 t  3 t  2 t  1 t tþ 1 tþ 2 tþ 3 tþ 4
GDP 0.1650 0.3754 0.5842 0.7828 1.0000 0.7828 0.5842 0.3754 0.1650
(0.0134) (0.0124) (0.0105) (0.0078) (0.0000) (0.0078) (0.0105) (0.0124) (0.0134)
Consumption 0.3390 0.5100 0.6396 0.7047 0.6871 0.4950 0.3105 0.1281 0.0219
(0.0224) (0.0199) (0.0159) (0.0116) (0.00114) (0.0128) (0.0106) (0.0091) (0.0083)
Investment 0.0012 0.1658 0.3570 0.5763 0.8759 0.7133 0.5714 0.4137 0.2328
(0.0075) (0.0081) (0.0079) (0.0077) (0.0043) (0.0089) (0.0126) (0.0147) (0.0156)
Loans 0.5711 0.5622 0.5123 0.4012 0.1920 0.0392 0.2346 0.3815 0.4774
(0.0083) (0.0077) (0.0084) (0.0099) (0.0109) (0.0121) (0.0129) (0.0135) (0.0135)
Unemployment 0.1895 0.2237 0.2481 0.2591 0.2518 0.2052 0.1477 0.0914 0.0412
(0.0102) (0.0092) (0.0079) (0.0072) (0.0077) (0.0072) (0.059) (0.0048) (0.0042)
Bankruptcies 0.0483 0.0658 0.0715 0.0281 0.1552 0.1484 0.1260 0.1022 0.0606
(0.0179) (0.0185) (0.0179) (0.0142) (0.0171) (0.0226) (0.0228) (0.0210) (0.0166)
Note: Standard errors of Monte Carlo simulations in parentheses.
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households spend more net income on shares as the securitization propensity increases, it is worth noting that divi-
dends received by the same households also increase, therefore not leading to a substantial modification of house-
holds’ consumption decision (see boxplots in Figure 16).
Time series in Figure 17 show the ratio between off-BS credit and total credit. The toothed patterns are deter-
5mined by the timing of securitization activation. Every quarter, banks sell credit to the FVC, increasing the amount
of off-BS credit as well as its ratio with respect to the total credit. Among two quarters, the payments of credit
Figure 2. Boxplots and means of banks’ equity, for three different time spans (5, 10, and 15 years), three typologies of securitization
(TS, LS, and MS), and four values of l (0%, 15%, 30%, and 45%).
Figure 3. Boxplots and means of total loans yearly growth rate, for three different time spans (5, 10, and 15 years), three typologies
of securitization (TS, LS, and MS), and four values of l (0%, 15%, 30%, and 45%).
Figure 4. Boxplots and means of total mortgages yearly growth rate, for three different time spans (5, 10, and 15 years), three typol-
ogies of securitization (TS, LS, and MS), and four values of l (0%, 15%, 30%, and 45%).
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installments decrease the amount of off-balance sheet credit, with the result of a lower value of the ratio. Higher val-
ues of securitization propensity l raise the amount of off-BS credit. It is worth pointing out that, as explained in
Section 4, also for l equal to 0% banks can sell credit (Figure 17), but they rarely do it, because their risk-weighted
assets are usually lower than the ceiling. Boxplots in Figure 9 show the ratio of off-BS credit and total credit also for
5the LS and MS settings, but the ratio is lower with respect to TS setting, because only loans or mortgages are
Figure 5. Boxplots and means of total credit yearly growth rate, for three different time spans (5, 10, and 15 years), three typology
of securitization (TS, LS, and MS), and four values of l (0%, 15%, 30%, and 45%).
Figure 6. Boxplots and means of banks’ equity to in-BS credit ratio, for three different time spans (5, 10, and 15 years), three typolo-
gies of securitization (TS, LS, and MS), and four values of l (0%, 15%, 30%, and 45%).
Figure 7. In-BS credit (top panel), ABSs and MBSs in mutual funds balance sheet (middle panel), and total credit (bottom panel).
Four values of l are shown: 0%, 15%, 30%, and 45%.
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securitized; thus their amount over the total credit does not reach the same level of TS, due to the different risk-
weights of loans and mortgages and to the possibility, especially in MB scenario, that the amount of mortgages in
bank’s balance sheet is not enough to fulfill the securitization requests, especially in the long run. Therefore, LS and
MS scenarios represent a useful model’s sensitivity exercise, but we mainly refer to TS scenario in the results, since it
5represents the most complete and realistic framework.
Figure 8. Boxplots and means of in-BS credit yearly growth rate, for three different time spans (5, 10, and 15 years), three typolo-
gies of securitization (TS, LS, and MS), and four values of l (0, 15%, 30%, and 45%).
Figure 9. Boxplots and means of off-BS credit to total credit ratio, for three different time spans (5, 10, and 15 years), three typolo-
gies of securitization (TS, LS, and MS), and four values of l (0%, 15%, 30%, and 45%).
Figure 10. Quarterly securitized loans (top panel) and mortgages (bottom panel). Four values of l are shown: 0%, 15%, 30%, and 45%.
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The amount of off-BS credit has a direct impact on banks’ regulatory capital. Regulatory capital refers to the cap-
ital that banks must hold because of regulatory requirements. In our setting, the value of k is 10%, where k represent
the capital adequacy ratio (see equations (5) and (6)). This entails that the ratio between equity and risk-weighted
assets shall be at least 10%, i.e., banks can lend an amount of credit (weighted for the risk) equivalent to maximum
Figure 11. Private sector deposits (top panel) and banks’ equity level (bottom panel). Four values of l are shown: 0%, 15%, 30%,
and 45%.
Figure 12. Boxplots and means of in-BS credit level, for three different time spans (5, 10, and 15 years), three typologies of securi-
tization (TS, LS, and MS), and four values of l (0%, 15%, 30%, and 45%).
Figure 13. Boxplots and means of the mutual fund’s liquidity, for three different time span (5, 10, and 15 years), three typologies of
securitization (TS, LS, and MS), and four values of l (0%, 15%, 30%, and 45%).
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10 times their equity, that results in a value of a equal to 10 in equations (5) and (6), being a ¼ 1=k. In our results,
we do not show the ratio between equity and risk-weighted assets, but the ratio between equity and credit (not
weighted for the risk), to have a more intuitive measurement.
Time series in Figure 18 show the ratio between banks’ equity and in-BS credit as well as the ratio between banks’
5equity and the total credit. All scenarios present an equity to in-BS credit ratio equal or higher than the ratio between
equity and total credit. This is straightforward since total credit is the sum of in-BS and off-BS credit. It is worth
Figure 14. Boxplots and means of the mutual fund’s share issued, for three different time span (5, 10, and 15 years), three typolo-
gies of securitization (TS, LS, and MS), and four values of l (0%, 15%, 30%, and 45%).
Figure 15. Boxplots and means of the fraction of households’ net income invested in mutual fund’s shares, for three different time
span (5, 10, and 15 years), three typologies of securitization (TS, LS, and MS), and four values of l (0%, 15%, 30%, and 45%).
Figure 16. Boxplots and means of the mutual fund’s yearly dividends’ payment, for three different time span (5, 10, and 15 years),
three typologies of securitization (TS, LS, and MS), and four values of l (0%, 15%, 30%, and 45%).
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noting that, with the securitization enabled, even if banks formally satisfy the regulatory requirements, the systemic
risk exposure of the economy is different.
In fact, time series in Figure 18 highlight that the equity to total credit ratio far exceeds the limits that banks
should be subject to. This means that the regulatory capital requirement works (see boxplots in Figure 6), but banks,
5through securitization, are able to avoid the requirements and increase the credit in the economy, consequently aris-
ing the probability of bankruptcies and the systemic risk. Boxplots in Figures 6 and 19 give more information regard-
ing different scenarios. Even if the ratio computed in Figure 6 has different values for TS, LS, and MS settings, given
by different behavior of equity and credit, it is important to notice that the ratio is higher than 0.1, except from the
scenario with l¼45% at Year 15, due to a large number of bankruptcies that impact banks’ equity (see boxplots in
10Figure 20). In this specific case, the aggressive securitization strategy creates deep financial crises with real economic
effects, measured by the high number of firms’ bankruptcies. In turn, firms’ bankruptcies erode banks’ assets and
equity, pushing their capital level under the regulatory requirement. Boxplots in Figure 19, instead, show that the
real risk exposure of the economy, measured as the ratio between banks’ equity and total credit, exceeds the one
allowed by regulatory capital requirement in a more consistent way for higher lever of l and higher time spans. Our
Figure 17. Off-BS credit to total credit ratio. Four values of l are shown: 0%, 15%, 30%, and 45%.
Figure 18. Equity to in-BS credit ratio (top panel) and equity to total credit ratio (bottom panel). Four values of l are shown: 0%,
15%, 30%, and 45%.
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results show that banks can use securitization for regulatory capital arbitrage, to create more credit. The use of
securitization to avoid regulatory capital requirements is supported by the literature (Ambrose et al., 2005; Efing,
2015; Gimenez Roche and Lermyte, 2016). Moreover, the reduction of regulatory capital requirements on capital
and the consequent capacity of banks to supply new loans can change according to business cycle condition, as we
5show in the following subsections.
5.2 Credit cycle
Boxplots in Figures 3–5 show the growth rates of loans, mortgages, and total credit, respectively. We analyzed three
time horizons, i.e., from Year 3 until the end of Years 5, 10, and 15 that we consider as short-run, medium-run, and
long-run time periods. Boxplots indicate that loans, mortgages, and credit increase more consistently for high values
10of l in the short run. In the medium and long run, this is not true for l¼ 30% l¼ 45% scenario. Boxplots in
Figure 5 confirm that at Years 10 and 15, the growth rate of total credit is higher only for l¼ 15%, while too much
securitization, i.e., l¼ 30% l¼45%, leads to a lower growth rate’s average at Year-15 time span. Looking at Year-
5 analysis, TS setting shows higher credit growth rates for increasing values of l. Considering that at Year-5 time
span, business cycle is facing an expansion phase (see boxplots in Figures 21–23) without bankruptcies (see boxplot
15in Figure 20), we observe that securitization improves the economy through the higher amount of loans and mort-
gages lent by banks, during positive business cycle’s stage. LS and MS settings also are characterized by higher
growth rates for increasing level of securitization but do not reach the level of TS.
Moreover, LS scenario shows higher growth rates compared to MS. We argue that the main reason is due to the
different risk weight assigned to CGPs loans and household mortgages. As pointed out in Section 4.2, banks compute
20the amount of credit to securitize according to the risk-weighted assets that they want to remove from their balance
Figure 19. Boxplots and means of banks’ equity to total credit ratio, for three different time spans (5, 10, and 15 years), three typolo-
gies of securitization (TS, LS, and MS), and four values of l (0%, 15%, 30%, and 45%).
Figure 20. Boxplots and means of bankruptcies, for three different time spans (5, 10, and 15 years), three typologies of securitiza-
tion (TS, LS, and MS), and four values of l (0%, 15%, 30%, and 45%).
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sheet. They compute the risk weight of new loans taking into account the balance sheet’s debt and equity of CGPs
(see equation (4)), while risk-weighted mortgages are computed as the half of the mortgages value. Being the risk
weight of loans usually higher than 0.5, mortgages to be securitized in the MS setting may be higher than loans in the
LS one. This is relevant because there is a limit on the securitization volume, given by the amount of credit in bank’s
5balance sheet. In particular, applying the share of securitization only on loans or mortgages may have the effect that
banks could not securitize the amount required because not endowed with a sufficient amount of loans or mortgages.
The consequence is that, in the long run, banks have lower possibility to lend due to Basel II/III regulation and no
possibility to securitize. The effect is a credit crunch and a high number of illiquidity bankruptcies.
Figure 21. Boxplots and means of real consumption yearly growth rate, for three different time spans (5, 10, and 15 years), three
typologies of securitization (TS, LS, and MS), and four values of l (0%, 15%, 30%, and 45%).
Figure 22. Boxplots and means of real investment, for three different time spans (5, 10, and 15 years), three typologies of securitiza-
tion (TS, LS, and MS), and four values of l (0%, 15%, 30%, and 45%).
Figure 23. Boxplots and means of real GDP yearly growth rate, for three different time spans (5, 10, and 15 years), three typology of
securitization (TS, LS, and MS), and four values of l (0%, 15%, 30%, and 45%).
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In this work we do not focus on the effects of securitization on the housing market and on the demand of ABSs
and MBSs. We want to show the effects of different securitization settings on banks’ balance sheet. In this respect,
MS and LS differ only in terms of amount of securitized assets. This amount can be relevant because, given the same
value Sb, mortgages to be securitized in MS are usually higher than the loans in LS, for the reason explained above.
5In both cases, banks increase less their equity (according to l) when securitization mechanism starts, because they
use the channel of FVC to lend more (see boxplots in Figure 2). But in the TS and LS settings, banks can bear this
situation because they keep using securitization channel, increasing the amount of off-BS credit, as shown in boxplots
in Figure 9. In the MS case, instead, banks cannot securitize as much as they need because it is possible that there are
not enough mortgages in bank’s balance sheet, especially in the medium and long run. This leads a higher number of
10bankruptcies (boxplots in Figure 20) and worst economic performances (boxplots in Figures 21–24). Therefore, as
stated before, we mainly refer to TS scenario in the explanation of results, since it better assess the complete and
more realistic case that securitization involves both loans and mortgages.
Furthermore, we refer to bankruptcies only for CGPs, as we have not considered a resolution mechanism in case
of bank’s bankruptcy. This is not a limitation for our analysis, since negative bank’s equity simply results in a credit
15freeze, while bank tries to rise its equity. A resolution mechanism would burden on taxpayers and depositors, thus
reinforcing the negative economic spiral that we observe in case of high securitization propensity and confirming our
results. Anyhow, boxplots in Figure 2 show that banks’ equity on average is positive across our simulations.
5.3 Business cycle
Eurace model is able to reproduce endogenous business cycles and endogenous crises; see for instance Raberto et al.
20(2012). Time series in Figure 25 show real consumption, real investment, and bankruptcies, while time series in
Figure 26 show the central bank policy rate and the inflation rate. Real consumption and investment are
characterized by a growth trend in the long run and recessions of different intensity followed by recoveries. The long-
run growth is only triggered by capital accumulation (see boxplots in Figure 24), since firms are endowed with an ini-
tial amount of physical capital that can be increased. Changes in technology and increase of population are not con-
25sidered in this work, and we focus on the short-run out-of-equilibrium dynamics.
Therefore, we are interested in studying the role of securitization mechanism in affecting the short-term economic
performance and financial stability. However, medium- and long-run time spans (Years 10 and 15) include a longer
sequence of business cycles, and securitization may affect their length and amplitude.
To assess in an objective way the effects of different securitization propensities’ scenarios on business cycles, we
30measure recessions and expansions, for three securitization type scenarios (i.e., “Total securitization,” “Loans
securitization,” and “Mortgages securitisation”) and four securitization propensities (l¼ 0%, 15%, 30%, and 45%)
across 50 seeds and Year-15 time span. Recession is defined as 2 (or more) consecutive months of negative GDP
growth rate, while expansion is represented as 2 (or more) consecutive months of positive GDP growth rate. We
study those recessions and expansions in terms of quantity (# Recessions), i.e., the number of times that two or more
35consecutive GDP negative or positive growth occurs, duration (# months), given by the mean of the number of
Figure 24. Boxplots and means of capital stock yearly growth rate, for three different time spans (5, 10, and 15 years), three typolo-
gies of securitization (TS, LS, and MS), and four values of l (0%, 15%, 30%, and 45%).
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consecutive months in which GDP growth is negative or positive, and severity (GDP fall or growth (%)), measured
as the mean of the GDP decrease or increase, during recessions or expansions. In this way, we can compare how dif-
ferent scenarios impact on different phases of business cycles. Results of Tables 6 and 7 highlight that an increase in
the securitization propensity entails not only an higher number of recessions but also stronger downturns, with GDP
5decrease that reach 5% or even 6% in extreme scenarios. However, the duration is decreasing for higher values of l.
This is due to the fact that our definition of recession considers at least two consecutive months of negative GDP;
therefore, the higher number of recessions increases the probability to face shorter downturns. Regarding expansions,
Table 7 highlights that, despite some differences among credit quality scenarios, increasing values of l are linked
with higher expansion phases, suggesting that securitization mechanism has an amplification effect on the business
10cycle, since it triggers higher expansions and deeper recessions.
It is worth noting that the impact of securitization to the business cycle is mainly twofold:
• Through the credit cycle, securitization affects the amount of loans and mortgages lent to the CGPs and house-
holds, influencing investment and consumption.
Figure 25. Real consumption level (top panel), real investments (middle panel), and number of bankruptcies (bottom panel). Four
values of l are shown: 0%, 15%, 30%, and 45%.
Figure 26. CB policy rate (top panel) and inflation (bottom panel). Four values of l are shown: 0%, 15%, 30%, and 45%.
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• Through banks’ and mutual fund’s dividends paid to households, increasing their capital income.
Boxplots in Figures 20–24 show the main economic outputs for three time spans and three different settings: TS,
LS, and MS. TS scenario shows that in the short run, real investment level, real consumption, and real GDP yearly
growth rates increase for higher values of securitization propensity l. However, Year-5 time span is characterized by
an expansion phase of the business cycle. Results are different in the medium and long run, since the systemic risk
5arised by the increased amount of credit lent triggers more bankruptcies that hit banks’ equity and their lending activ-
ity, resulting in more severe downturns, especially when securitization propensity l is high. According to computa-
tional experiments, the best economic performances are achieved by the setting with l¼ 15%. A low level of
securitization is the best compromise between economic activity and financial fragility.
The presented results highlight the relevance of securitization process for the business cycle and the possible effects
10of securitization on the real economy, in line with other studies on this topic. For instance, Altunbas et al. (2009)
Table 7. Analysis of expansions, defined as two or more consecutive months of positive GDP growth
l # Expansions # months GDP growth (%)
TS (%)
0 19.6 (0.1) 4.9 (0.1) 3.0 (0.1)
15 20.3 (0.1) 4.8 (0.1) 3.0 (0.1)
30 21.5 (0.1) 4.3 (0.1) 3.5 (0.1)
45 23.0 (0.2) 4.0 (0.1) 4.7 (0.1)
LS (%)
0 19.6(0.1) 5.0 (0.1) 3.1 (0.1)
15 19.8 (0.1) 4.9 (0.1) 2.9 (0.1)
30 20.8 (0.1) 4.7 (0.1) 3.1 (0.1)
45 20.8 (0.1) 4.6 (0.1) 3.4 (0.1)
MS (%)
0 19.6(0.1) 4.9 (0.1) 3.1 (0.1)
15 22.6 (0.1) 4.2 (0.1) 4.8 (0.1)
30 21.6 (0.1) 4.2 (0.1) 4.9 (0.1)
45 21.6 (0.1) 4.2 (0.2) 4.9 (0.1)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 6. Analysis of recessions, defined as two or more consecutive months of negative GDP
l # Recessions # Months GDP fall (%)
TS (%)
0 12.6 (0.1) 4.0 (0.1) 3.1 (0.1)
15 12.8 (0.1) 3.6 (0.1) 3.3 (0.1)
30 15.1 (0.1) 3.3 (0.1) 3.7 (0.1)
45 15.7 (0.1) 2.9 (0.1) 5.8 (0.1)
LS (%)
0 12.8(0.1) 3.9 (0.1) 3.3 (0.1)
15 12.9 (0.1) 3.8 (0.2) 3.1 (0.1)
30 13.3 (0.1) 3.4 (0.1) 3.3 (0.1)
45 13.5 (0.1) 3.7 (0.2) 3.6 (0.1)
MS (%)
0 12.5(0.1) 3.9 (0.1) 3.3 (0.1)
15 16.8 (0.2) 2.7 (0.1) 6.6 (0.1)
30 16.8 (0.1) 2.9 (0.1) 6.2 (0.1)
45 18.0 (0.2) 2.8 (0.2) 6.1 (0.2)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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show how banks increase their lending activity using securitization for regulatory capital arbitrage and point
out, using empirical analysis, that this effect is maximized during economic expansions. We show this aspect since, in
our results, the credit expansion is higher across the Year-5 time span, where business cycle is facing an expansion
phase. Moreover, we show that during economic downturns securitization impacts negatively the business cycle,
5especially for high values of securitization propensity. Also Peersman and Wagner (2015) analyze lending,
securitization, and risk-taking shocks and find that securitization has relevant effects on US business cycle.
Furthermore, Bertay et al. (2016) show the credit composition channel of securitization, stating that countries with
more securitization on business loans have higher economic growth, as opposed to household mortgages. Although
we focus on the credit volume channel, we find that securitization can result in more investments and thus trigger
10economic activity.
In addition to the related literature, we observe that securitization can have positive or negative effects on business
cycle, depending on the securitization propensity and economic conditions. If securitization propensity is low, it can
help lending activity without overly exposing the economy, resulting in less severe economic recessions. An increase
in the securitization propensity, instead, amplifies the economic performance during growing periods but leads to
15deeper economic downturns.
6. Concluding remarks
This work focuses on the study of securitization impact on credit and business cycles using an agent-based stock–flow
consistent model. For this purpose, Eurace agent-based macroeconomic simulator has been enhanced with the add-
ition of the securitization mechanism and new agents, namely, FVC and mutual fund.
20Through securitization, banks are able to sell loans and mortgages to FVC, which pools them and issues ABSs and
MBSs, sold to the mutual fund, which can issue shares to finance its activity. A securitization propensity (l) has been
introduced to study the effects of different degrees of securitization. Quarterly, depending on its value, banks deter-
mine the amount of risk-weighted assets to securitize. Securitization mechanism impacts the structure of banks’ bal-
ance sheet and influences the credit cycle, due to the banks’ ability to overcome Basel II/III capital requirements.
25Computational experiments’ results show that in the short run, securitization triggers a boom to the growth but
increases significantly the fragility of the economy in the long run. The best economic performance in the short run is
given by the highest values of l. This is not confirmed in a time span of 10 years, where scenarios with the highest l
are affected negatively by the fragility of the banking sector. In the long run, the best scenario is given by l¼ 15%,
which also shows better results for all simulations’ time spans compared to the baseline scenario (l¼0%), suggesting
30that a restrained securitization can be a benefit for the economy. Higher levels of securitization propensity, instead,
cause severe crises in the long run due to the increased financial fragility given by banks’ excessive use of
securitization, leading to bankruptcies of CGPs and households’ capital income reductions.
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